DEC Is Dead, Long Live DEC: The Lasting Legacy of Digital Equipment Corporation

Was expecting a more technical look at DEC, but enjoyed the thorough view of the positive and negative aspects of its culture and its demise, even as the company lives on through its managers, employees and products.

One of the first computers I worked on was a Dec-10. I also used one of the PDPs. Then I later was sysadmin and wrote Fortran code for a Vax 785. So I was rather nostalgaic over DEC's demise. This would have seemed inconceivable in the mid 80s, when DEC was at its height, and second only to IBM. But Schein's analysis points out that the seeds of DEC's fall were already flourishing at its apex.One merit of the book is how it points out that it was not just Ken Olsen who made all the bad decisions. Notably that the "PC was just a toy". It was also the rest of the top management. Worsened by a complex matrix management structure. This had the effect of drastically slowing decision making.The book is a sad tale of what might have beens. For instance, it is well known how DEC missed the PC revolution. But it also dropped the ball on networking. DEC came up with DECNET by 1984. It had many very capable network engineers. But DEC's routers and switches were only for DECNET. DEC could have been DEC+Cisco, if it had migrated aggressively to the Arpanet/Internet. Sure, it had some presence in the latter. But not enough. It kept pushing its DECNET and in the end the Internet just drove DECNET into irrelevance.

I recommend this book to anyone who is familiar with DEC or wishes to understand its enduring legacies. It is also a useful case study on who a company that was doing so well could ultimately fail; are Microsoft and IBM really immune from this fate?I used DEC equipment during its heyday from the late 1970's throughout the 1980s. What I value most is how the technical experiences I recall from that time were given depth. The author's narrative binds together a collection of internal memos and personal recollections of many of those who were working at DEC when many of its fateful decisions were made. In general, responsibility for the ultimate failure of DEC to survive as a company is laid with the senior management, in particular with CEO Ken Olsen. The same attributes that made DEC great and innovative were the ones that lead to its downfall. Alas, DEC is not dead but lives on in all the innovations it introduced.I would like liked to have seen some more details on the technical innovations and more exposure to the myths and legends that many of us were weaned on. But that was not the main thesis of the book so it's not a deficiency per se.Though written in a straightforward and matter of fact way with little flourish, I was engrossed and quickly polished it off. This book needed to be written.

This is a some times draggy book but does explain the factors that led to DEC's demise. The balkanization into fiefdoms is well explained. We had VAX 3100 workstations and VAX 3800 computers. They worked great but by the mid '80s were underpowered. A new RFP was issued and DEC bid the 8600; great but overkill. I wound up working on the GE Aerospace Division Terminal Working Group (we were responsible for promoting new technologies as well as evaluating which to adopt). The VT180/278 basically shoved a Z80 with CPM or added PDP8, not a good try. None of the DEC attempts at a PC were cost effective or viable. Although Health Kit sold a kit version of the PDP11 at a reasonable price--if you didn't need software. Then in the '90 they came out with a version of VMS for the Intel 486 with full functionality. We ordered 20,000 copies with a follow on of up to 1M copies. We were told that we could not get it as Ken Olsen torpedoed the project. That could have saved DEC. We were not the only customer with strong interest and I would estimate that DEC could have sold several 50M copies.Aside from the odd omissions by the author (DEC's PDP10/20 large scale computers are barely mentioned) and no mention of VMS on the VAX this is a great book and research resource on DEC. As for why the VMS on Intel was torpedoed it's not clear but Ken may have gotten the blame for what others did. Certainly it was a disruptive technology that would have killed off most of DEC's computer lines fairly quickly. But DEC could have supplanted MS!DEC pioneered a lot of things that have led to the cloud computing today.

Having worked for Digital for 30 years, I found the book informative and the inside baseball information interesting. It probably won't resonate for those who didn't have a relationship with the Company.

As a 17 year veteran of digital equipment corporation, I enjoy reliving our perennial discussions (arguments). I wonder at the ability of Ken Olsen to inspire by empowerment. I also wonder at the depth of the final fall from profitability. The questions are raised, but not completely answered by this book.

As advertised. A reasonable price. Received within a short time.

It brought back many good memories.

A personal favourite - because it's about a company I loved.According to some the world's first learning organisation, DEC was a phenomenon.This book lays out the history and also gives a brilliant insight into the consultancy interventions of its author Edgar Schein, who apparently first coined the term "process consulting".

The book vindicates what us, DEC alumni, have known for a long time: it was lack of coherent management that sank Digital.That and a certain amount of hubris and disconnect of middle managers who refused to listen to engineers' input. Oh well, Ed Schein is absolutely right: we are the DEC legacy. Tant pis pour la compagnie, vive les engenieurs.

amazingly integrated perspective and analysis of organizational purpose , strategy , culture and operations.

３０年で散り去ったDECという企業に勤めていた者にとっては懐かしい内容がふんだんにあります。卒業アルバムのようなものでしょうか。